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Sinopse
This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker’s beliefs about causal relations into account.The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a ‘representation theorem’ that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey’s logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book shows how to obtain a unique utility and probability representation for preferences and judgements of comparative likelihood. The book also contains a major new discussion of what it means to suppose that some event occurs or that some proposition is true.
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Especificações
| ISBN | 9780521641647 |
|---|---|
| Pré venda | Não |
| Peso | 317g |
| Livro disponível - pronta entrega | Não |
| Tipo item | Livro Importado |
| Número de páginas | 284 |
| Código Interno | 40520 |
| Código de barras | 9780521641647 |
| Acabamento | HARDCOVER |
| Autor | JOYCE, JAMES M. |
| Editora | CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS |
| Sob encomenda | Sim |
